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Prosecution, Society and Politics: 
The Penalization 
of Economic Collaboration in Belgium 
After The Second World War 
Dirk Luyten1 
I n this article the perception of economic collaboration by Belgian population 
after the Second World War and its consequences for the policy of the prose-
cution service are examined. There was no general dissatisfaction on the way Bel-
gian entrepreneurs behaved during the war. Only those who worked exclusively for 
the needs of the German army or mistreated the workers were attacked. Another tar-
get of public discontent were small entrepreneurs as grocers or innkeepers who 
were accused of black market activities. This attitude can be explained by the fact 
that workers feared deportation to Germany and therefore accepted that industry 
was kept in activity. This was in line with the policy of the main holding companies. 
As a consequence, the prosecution service found not much support for its ambitious 
policy that was also directed against big firms. On the other hand, the reactions of 
the population made clear that public opinion would not accept that economic col-
laboration in general remained without punishment. Therefore a prompt trial and 
severe sanctions against entrepreneurs who had done business with the enemy were 
a priority for the Chief Military Prosecutor Ganshof van der Meersch. 
Cet article analyse la perception de la collaboration économique dans la popu-
lation belge après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et ses conséquences sur la poli-
tique du ministère public. Il n'existait pas de mécontentement général au sujet de la 
conduite des entrepreneurs belges durant la guerre. Seuls furent pris à partie ceux 
qui travaillaient exclusivement au service de l'armée allemande, ou qui maltrai-
taient les travailleurs, ou encore de petits entrepreneurs, épiciers, cafetiers, soup-
çonnés de marché noir. Cette attitude consistant à accepter la poursuite de l'activité 
industrielle s'explique par la crainte des ouvriers d'être déportés en Allemagne et 
était du reste conforme à la politique des holdings. Il en résulta que le ministère 
public ne trouva pas beaucoup de soutien à son ambitieuse politique qui visait éga-
lement les grandes entreprises. D'un autre côté, les réactions de la population mon-
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traient que l'opinion publique n'accepterait pas l'impunité de l'ensemble de la col-
laboration économique. C'est pourquoi le prompt procès et la punition sévère des 
entrepreneurs ayant fait affaire avec l'ennemi étaient une priorité pour l'auditeur-
général Ganshof, van der Meersch. 
There is little research on the prosecution and punishment of acts of economic 
collaboration after the Second World War. And the few studies that have dealt with 
it tend to take a rather idealistic, and sometimes moralizing approach. The implicit 
premise of their analysis is that the judiciary should be « impartial » and must not be 
influenced by political pressure or by what is referred to as «public opinion »2. 
This approach, which is no longer favoured to the same extent in modern crimi-
nal law theory, is not adequate to explain the actions taken by the courts3. It may even 
be anachronistic inasmuch as the judicial policy immediately after the war is exami-
ned and tested by means of present-day legal standards, which are highly institutio-
nal and ideal-typical (an independent judiciary, which only judges on legal grounds). 
It is this approach which dominates Belgian historiography on the so-called 
« repression » (the clampdown on former collaborators) and results in a clearly nega-
tive assessment of the way collaboration was dealt with. The prosecution and 
punishment of acts of economic collaboration is a crucial element in the criticism of 
the way the judiciary operated, and which did not meet the criteria of the proper dis-
pensation of justice. The latter implies equality before the law, which is reflected in 
the equal punishment of similar types of crimes in the various judicial districts and 
an equal treatment of the various kinds of collaboration4. 
It is precisely in this area that the punishment of economic collaboration went 
wrong. This form of collaboration with the enemy was prosecuted far less than poli-
tical and military collaboration, whereby the big economic collaborators, i.e. large 
industrial concerns, got off scot-free. This result has been ascribed to the existence 
of a tacit agreement between the judiciary and the government to pass over indus-
trialists who had done business with the enemy, as they played a crucial role in the 
reconstruction. Furthermore, as the government was involved in the construction of 
a social system which relied on all classes working together, it did not wish to anta-
gonize the industrialists unnecessarily. This largely contributed to the general fee-
ling at the time that there was a biased sense of justice, which undermined the legi-
timacy of the repression. 
It is difficult to verify these theories as there has been too little investigation of 
the primary sources. Moreover, the basic premises of this approach are flawed ; it 
does not sufficiently take into account the relation between the judiciary and the 
social environment. Too little attention has been paid to the social and political 
views and mentalities of the judges, and the political force field within which the 
courts had to operate is not adequately examined. The most important criticism of 
this approach, however, involves the evaluation of the legitimacy of the actions 
taken by the courts. This can only be assessed in relation to the overall context of the 
period and based on an analysis of the population's views and responses, and not a 
posteriori by applying current standards. In this article, it is primarily the latter 
aspect that we will deal with. The central question in this respect is how the popula-
2
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3
 T.Hart (1994). 
4
 In the first place Huyse, Dhondt (1993) and Huyse, Hoflack (1995). 
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tion looked at the repression of economic collaboration, their expectations and the 
extent to which this influenced the judiciary. Among hisorians there is increasing 
emphasis on the interference between the way in which public opinion perceives 
reality and the political decision-making processes5. The same question may be put 
with regard to the policy of the Crown Prosecution Service, especially in the period 
of crisis of authority after the Second World War. 
We will examine the policy of the Chief Military Prosecutor (auditeur-generaal, 
auditeur-général) Walter-Jean Ganshof van der Meersch. This legist headed the 
military prosecution departments, laid down the prosecution policy and supervised 
its execution. He was without any doubt the central figure in the postwar repression 
period. In addition, Ganshof van der Meersch was High Commissioner for the Secu-
rity of the Territory (Hoog Commissaris voor's Lands Veiligheid; Haut Commis-
saire à la Sécurité de l'État), an institution set up by the Belgian government in exile 
in London in order to ensure a smooth liberation of the country, with law and order 
being a priority. 
The fact that he wore several hats is already quite remarkable. The High Com-
missioner's Office monitored public opinion, and its reports allow us to reconstruct 
the ideas and sentiments among the population at the time. This constitutes the bulk 
of the paper. However, in order adequately to interpret these data it is necessary to 
examine the judicial apparatus during the repression. The following paragraph deals 
with the role played by the High Commissioner's Office for the Security of the Ter-
ritory and its relationship with the military tribunals. 
The provinces of Belgium 
5
 Laborie (1991). 
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I. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REPRESSION 
The prosecution and punishment of crimes committed against the external secu-
rity of the state was entrusted to the military judiciary, which consisted of courts 
martial (krijgsraden, conseils de guerre) and the Court of Military Appeals (Krijgs-
hof; Cour militaire), which were part of the ordinary judiciary. Any proposals to 
directly involve the resistance in the repression met with Ganshof's veto. The courts 
martial and Court of Military Appeals were composed of a civilian magistrate and 
lay judges, who were officers or reserve officers. With a view to processing the acts 
of collaboration, the number of civilian magistrates was increased. As the number of 
courts martial and courts of military appeals rose dramatically, it became necessary 
to call on more reserve officers. The combination of these two factors resulted in a 
weakening of the strictly military character of these courts. 
The Crown Prosecution Service was controlled by the military prosecutors 
(krijgsauditeur; auditeur militaire) and their assistants (substituut, substitut). Here, 
too, the staff was increased in order to try collaboration more effectively. At the level 
of the Court of Military Appeals, the Crown Prosecution Service was represented by 
the chief military public prosecutor, his assistants (substituut, substitut) and court of 
appeals public prosecutors (advocaat-generaal, avocat-général). One of them was 
charged specifically with dealing with economic collaboration. Contrary to non-mili-
tary criminal law, the public prosecution departments were headed by one single per-
son, i.e. the Chief Military Prosecutor, whose jurisdiction extended across the coun-
try, rather than being limited to a number of judicial districts as is the case for a Chief 
Prosecutor (procureur-generaal, procureur-général)6. 
Ganshof was both Chief Military Prosecutor and High Commissioner for the 
Security of the Territory, the body which was founded on 29 July 1943. The appoint-
ment of Ganshof, who had been the Chief Military Prosecutor since 1940, followed 
only a few days later. The duty of the High Commissioner was to ensure the security 
of the state and the maintenance of law and order. In addition, the High Commissio-
ner had to keep the ministers abreast of the situation in their areas of competence, 
and possibly recommend certain measures. The High Commissioner was also res-
ponsible for the coordination of the security and action services and was conse-
quently well informed about the situation and popular feeling in occupied territories. 
The High Commissioner's main concern, to which all other things were in fact 
subordinate, was the maintaining of law and order after the liberation. This task had 
a political aim, since Belgium was confronted with several political problems after 
the liberation that made restoration of the prewar political system and the legitimacy 
of the state difficult. The London government was not very popular and had to com-
pete with the resistance movements, which aspired to political power. King and 
government had been in conflict since May 1940. The position of the King was a 
quasi permanent source of confrontation that opposed left and right. The Commu-
nist Party had participated actively in the struggle against the Germans and had as a 
consequence gained much sympathy. The Party created a network of organizations 
including a trade union but aimed at political participation following an adapted ver-
sion of the Popular Front strategy. The Party became a partner in the government 
6
 Gilissen (undated, p. 11-17). For more details on the organization of the military courts and their acti-
vities : Huyse, Dhondt (1993) and Gilissen (1951). 
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coalition but was nevertheless considered to be a threat by the traditional political 
powers. In this political context, the London government aimed at a quick restora-
tion of the authority of the state. Ganshof had a key role to play in this process as 
High Commissioner as well as Chief Military Prosecutor7. A priority in this restora-
tion process was the punishment of collaboration, which should be dealt with as 
quickly as possible. To this end, the High Commissioner also contributed to a num-
ber of statutory orders appurtenant to the organization of courts martial, the proce-
dure and the withdrawal of certain rights of those convicted of collaboration. 
Although the High Commissioner was involved in other legislative actions, the 
repression constituted the lion's share of his brief. In the implementation phase, the 
maintenance of law and order and the repression that went along with it played a 
prominent role8. 
The High Commissioner's Office was involved in the repression in two ins-
tances, or, to be more precise, in two aspects of the same issue. First of all, the offi-
cers were faced with the population's reactions against the collaborators. And 
secondly, the High Commissioner's Office played a central role in the internment of 
alleged collaborators. 
As had been the case after the First World War, the judicial, police and adminis-
trative powers that be were given the authority to intern Germans and Belgians who 
were suspected of having collaborated with the enemy and thus posed a threat to 
public safety. The category of 'suspect' Belgians included those who had borne 
arms and/or worn the enemy's uniform, those who had worked in German adminis-
trative services, and any other persons whose behaviour during the occupation had 
been such that they had caused a scandal or could cause a disturbance of public order 
in that their release would invite reprisals. One observer noted that: «Here concern 
for their safety is merged with concern for the preservation of public order.»9 The 
officers of the High Commissioner's Office had to communicate guidelines for the 
internments to the competent authorities, and organize the internments and the 
centres to such an extent as was necessary to maintain public order. Furthermore, the 
High Commissioner, as Ganshof himself pointed out, had been closely involved in 
the drawing up of guidelines pertaining to the internments 10.The circular containing 
these guidelines emphasises the relationship between maintaining public order and 
the repression. One contemporary analysed the situation as follows. Not all military 
prosecution departments were able to start their operations immediately after the 
liberation. In the period between the liberation and the first tribunals, the civilian 
prosecution departments would have to act against the collaborators. These were, 
however, «...too accustomed to respecting individual liberties to impose on traitors 
the preventive detention that public opinion was clamouring for»11. This view was 
also shared by Ganshof. 
Looking back on his activities as High Commissioner, he called the popular reac-
tions against the collaborators one of the most important sources of unrest. In his 
7
 There is an abundant literature on post-war Belgium. We limit ourselves to two basic titles in French : 
Gotovitch (1992), Gérard-Libois, Gotovitch (1991). 
8
 Rapport... (S.d.,p. 11-29). 
9
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10
 Rapport... (S.d., p. 9-19). 
11
 «Trop habitués au respect des libertés individuelles pour prendre à l'égard des traîtres les mesures 
de détention préventive, que l'opinion publique exigeait avec fracas», Cassart (1944, p. 21). 
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view, they were entirely to be expected: «There was nothing surprising about such 
reactions: the population, wich had suffered at the hands of the enemy and their col-
laborators, had a passionate desire to see those who had betrayed their country or 
benefited from enemy occupation punished, although they were not always aware of 
the enormous difficulties entailed in organizing the problem of repression and pur-
suing an ideal of justice in accordance with legal process and the law.»n 
There were two peaks in the reactions against collaborators: immediately after 
the liberation and in May 1945, when the return of prisoners of war stirred up vio-
lent emotions among the population. The High Commissioner's Office informed the 
government of these reactions and requested measures that be taken, while attemp-
ting to ease the tension13. 
The fact that the Chief Military Prosecutor and the High Commissioner for the 
Security of the Territory, who was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, 
were one and the same person clearly reveals the close relationship between the 
repression and the reactions on the part the population. In other words, it shows the 
need to legitimize the punishment of collaboration to the people. This symbiosis 
also manifested itself in logistical details. The High Commissioner's officers were 
instructed to establish their offices in the immediate vicinity of the military tribu-
nals14. 
The result of the combination of the two positions was that Ganshof was kept 
directly informed of the development of public opinion and of any bursts of outrage 
against the collaborators on the part of the population. The High Commissioner's 
officers, who operated on a provincial level, regularly reported on the general opi-
nion in their areas. This information was complemented by reports from the natio-
nal security service and from the state police (rijkswacht/ gendarmerie). The latter 
moreover compiled detailed reports of attacks on collaborators and of social 
conflicts. These sources allow a reconstruction of the population's perception of 
economic collaborators. 
II. PUBLIC OPINION AND ECONOMIC COLLABORATION 
A. The nature of the sources 
The information about the way economic collaboration was perceived by the 
population, and which is contained in the reports in the archives of the High Com-
missioner's Office, can be divided into four levels. 
The first level is that of physical reactions against collaborators. These involved 
acts of violence against alleged collaborators, attacks on their houses, the pillaging 
of their possessions, the burning of furniture, smashing of windows, the painting of 
swastikas, etc. These are known directly through the reports, by the gendarmerie in 
particular. 
12
 «Elles n'avaient rien de surprenant: la population, qui avait souffert du fait de l'ennemi et de ses 
collaborateurs, désirait passionnément voir punir ceux qui avaient trahi leur pays ou tiré profit de 
l'occupation ennemie, sans toujours se rendre compte des énormes difficultés que présentaient l'or-
ganisation du problème de la répression et la «poursuite d'un idéal de justice» conformément au 
droit et à la loi.» 
13
 Rapport... (S.d., p. 30). 
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 Ibidem (p. 105). 
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The second level of perception revolves around the population's views of eco-
nomic collaboration and the prosecution of it. This becomes clear indirectly from 
the reports by the national security service (staatsveiligheid; sûreté de l'État) on the 
development of public opinion. 
The third level is of an organizational nature. Political parties and resistance 
organizations held rallies and distributed posters and pamphlets in an attempt to 
channel and politicize the displeasure of the population. This does not directly 
reflect the way public opinion perceived economic collaboration, but it does provide 
some indication of the specific foci, which, or so it was assumed by these organiza-
tions, would strike a chord with the population. 
The last level consisted of social conflicts and trade-union activities. These 
inform us on the way workers within a particular company judged their employer's 
position during the war. 
This material is supplemented by reports and correspondence containing more 
details on certain demonstrations or events. They provide details on the sociological 
backgrounds of the demonstrators or on their political intentions. In this respect, it is 
important to consider the attacks against the collaborators. Some historians maintain 
that demonstrations against collaborators were entirely unspontaneous and incited 
and coordinated by resistance organizations, particularly the communists, who thus 
attempted to destabilize the state15. This thesis is not substantiated by the archives of 
the High Commissioner's Office. In his final report, Ganshof remarked that, on the 
whole, the reactions against the collaborators arose spontaneously. It was only after 
some time that they were provoked or organized16. According to Ganshof, the 
exploitation for political purposes or for personal revenge of what he called «the 
population's legitimate sense of outrage » should be situated around the end of May, 
or early June 194517. The comments on the reports allowed the cancelling out of 
these types of attacks, and they are not included in the counts. 
B. Protests against collaborators 
The attacks against collaborators reached a peak in the spring of 1945, when the 
political prisoners returned from Germany. At that moment, more and more trials of 
economic collaboration were held. In March 1945, 26 economic collaborators had 
been sentenced. By the 1st June 1945 the number was 10318. Previously, few acts of 
violence against collaborators had been reported. However, there was a great deal of 
disenchantment among the population with the organization of internment camps 
and the release policy that was conducted there. In theory, decisions on this were not 
taken by the military judges, but by the Minister of Justice; in practice, however, the 
decision-making powers lay with consultative commissions which advised the 
minister. These consisted of a magistrate and solicitors19. The population as well as 
certain police forces complained that prominent Germanophiles and economic col-
1 5
 Pauwels (1994). 
16
 Rapport... (S.d., p. 30). 
1 7
 Ganshof to the Prime Minister, 26.V.1945 and 2.VI.1945, SOMA (Studie-en Onderzoekscentrum 
Oorlog en Hedendaagse Maatschappij / Centre d'Études Guerres et Sociétés contemporaines), Hoog 
Commissariaat voor's Lands Veiligheid, 1311. 
1 8
 Report of Ganshof for the Ministre of Justice 1st June 1945, SOMA. 
1 9
 Cassart (1944, p. 35). 
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laboratory were released more quickly and more easily by the commissions20. The 
internees themselves were not happy either with the policies implemented by the 
commissions. In the St. Kruis camp, near Brugge, a revolt broke out among the 
internees because a prominent economic collaborator was set free21. 
Not only were economic collaborators released more quickly and more easily, 
they also enjoyed various privileges. This was most visible in the distribution of par-
cels sent by relatives of certain rich internees. In December 1944, the national gen-
darmerie commander recommended that the distribution of parcels should in fact be 
forbidden. It favoured the rich, and the goods could be bought with ill-gotten gains 
resulting from, for instance, black-marketing during the war. It was this which shoc-
ked the population22. 
Disenchantment with judicial action itself was quite limited. In the West Flan-
ders town of Roeselare, there was some dissatisfaction about the fact that some 
unnamed economic collaborators were left alone23. In the Hainaut town of Tournai, 
a liqueur trader, who was suspected of black-marketeering during the occupation, 
was the victim of an assault24. However, in the first six months after the liberation 
there was no general sweeping protest against the way the judiciary dealt with eco-
nomic collaboration. There was, however, widespread opposition to the social 
inequalities in the internment camps, both in terms of material advantages and early 
releases. By the spring of 1945, the situation had changed dramatically. 
With varying degrees of intensity, collaborators all over the country suffered the 
wrath of the population. The table below (p. 125) lists all types of attacks against 
collaborators of all types, for each province25. 
The table reveals that the release of internees remained a bone of contention, 
albeit with different degrees of intensity in the various provinces. There was parti-
cular disenchantment in the provinces of Hainaut, Oost-and West-Vlaanderen. Most 
striking is the great difference in the number of attacks between the provinces. The 
animosity against collaborators was the greatest in Oost-and West-Vlaanderen and 
Hainaut, whereas the number of actions against collaborators in Namur and Luxem-
bourg was negligible. There was not always a direct connection with the industrial 
character of the provinces, as the low score in the industrial province Liege shows. 
2 0
 Report state security police Mechelen 5.I.1945, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat voor's Lands Veilig-
heid, 1252; Hainaut 3.II. 1945, ibidem, 1279; National commander gendarmerie to the commander 
for the province of Limburg 13.XII.1944, ibidem, 1292; Ganshof to the Minister of Justice 7.1.1945, 
ibidem, 1211. 
2 1
 National commander of the gendarmerie to the Military Prosecutor in Brugge 14.XII. 1944, SOMA, 
Hoog Commissariaat, 1211. For the location of the towns see the map of Belgium. 
2 2
 National commander of the gendarmerie to the High Commissioner for National Security 
16.XII.1944, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1211 and State security police to assistant Chief Mili-
tary Prosecutor Landrien 27.I.1945, ibidem, 1247. 
2 3
 Report state security police Roeselare 21.XII.1944, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1271. 
2 4
 Report state security police Hainaut 3.II.1945, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1279. 
2 5
 Table based on reports of state security police, gendarmerie and officers of the High Commissioner-
ship for National Security and the local police in SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1303-1306, 1307-
1309, 1315-1316, 1320-1321, 1325. The number of 'unknown' cases is rather high, but we can 
assume that not many industrialists are included since they were well known to the police. The vali-
dity of our conclusions concerning economic collaboration is not put into question. 
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Table T. Attacks against collaborators 
Table 2: Percentage of workers employed in industry (1937)' 
Although the period during which the attacks took place also differed, there was no 
connection between the number of attacks and the time frame in which they occurred. 
Local phenomena such as specific events during the occupation, political power 
balance, the policy of the consultative commissions and the military prosecutors all 
played a role in the attacks. The military prosecutor in Charleroi ascribed the great 
hatred of collaborators to the severe actions by the occupier and his Belgian accom-
plices28. We cannot go into this in depth as this would take us too far for the scope of 
this article. It is more important to know the extent to which the anger of the popu-
lation turned against economic collaborators. The table below combines all attacks 
2 6
 Type of victim «unknown» means that the motivation for the attack is not clear from the police 
reports, or in other words, that it is not certain that an attack was directed against a collaborator. Some 
attacks had other backgrounds such as personal rivalries. So, the total number of attacks for which 
we are sure that collaboration was the reason is 797. 
2 7
 Table taken from: Veraghtert (1979, p. 99). 
2 8
 The Military Prosecutor in Charleroi to Chief Military Prosecutor, 7.X.1944, SOMA, Hoog Com-
missariaat voor's Lands Veiligheid, 1180. 
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against economic collaborators in the broadest sense of the term. The crime of eco-
nomic collaboration is defined in article 115 of the Penal Code, which says that any 
delivery of commodities of whatever kind to the enemy is punishable by death. The 
economic collaborators are a disparate group of traders, shopkeepers, innkeepers, 
industrialists and volunteers for work detail in Germany. In all these cases, we may 
assume that their economic activity during the war gave rise to criticism by the 
population, as combinations of economic and political types of collaboration were 
mentioned separately. This mixed category was not included in these figures. 
Table 3: Share of economic collaboration in the attacks against collaborators 
For Luxembourg, Namur, Antwerpen, Liège and Brabant, we have to limit our-
selves to the absolute figures as the totals are too low to calculate percentages, 
making it difficult to infer many relevant conclusions from these figures. It is worth 
mentioning the Liège industrial area, where, despite the existence of major left-wing 
trade-unionist pockets, only three attacks took place against persons who had exer-
cised an economic activity during the occupation. Furthermore, not one single 
industrialist fell victim to the people's wrath. The three cases concern a farmer, an 
innkeeper and a greengrocer. In Oost- and West-Vlaanderen, Limburg and Hainaut 
the share of economic collaboration was quite high. It fluctuated between 26,2% and 
40,8%. At first sight, this reveals a higher degree of disapproval of economic colla-
boration on the part of the population. However, this figure must be interpreted cor-
rectly. First of all, economic collaboration was not the main and exclusive object of 
criticism. This becomes evident if one takes a look at the percentages for other types 
of collaboration, especially political and military collaboration. In Limburg, econo-
mic collaborators constituted the dominant group. Other targeted individuals for-
med a heterogeneous group, with the exception of released internees, who made up 
17.9% of the total. In the other provinces, the situation was entirely different. In 
West-Vlaanderen, the anger directed against political collaborators and municipal 
council members was slightly higher than that to which economic collaborators 
(27.7%) were subjected. Similarly, this was also the case in Hainaut, where this 
group represented 30% of the total. In Oost-Vlaanderen, the dominance of political 
collaborators was less pronounced (14.9%). In the same province, informers (6.9%) 
and military collaborators (5.4%) were a much-targeted group. In other words, 
although economic collaborators were subjected to violence, they were not the main 
target of the population's anger. 
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The dividing line did not run between economic collaborators and other types of 
cooperation with the enemy, but rather between those forms of collaboration which 
were visible within the community and those that were not. People who had worn 
the enemy uniform, political collaborators and local government officials were not 
only visible, their activities frequently had had direct, unpleasant consequences for 
the population and had affected daily life. The municipal councils, for instance, 
played a role in the provisioning and forced employment in Germany. A more detai-
led analysis of the group of economic collaborators provides further confirmation of 
the thesis that proximity played a greater role than the type of collaboration. The 
data are broken down for each province in table 4 2 9. 
Table 4: Number of reactions against certain types of economic collaborators 
This division puts the high number of attacks on economic collaborators into 
perspective. With the exception of Hainaut, the largest category is that of shopkee-
pers (mainly innkeepers and grocers, but also hairdressers). Again, these are indivi-
duals who were highly visible in the local community and played a central role in 
daily life (this is particularly true for grocers). As a result, the consequences of their 
actions were immediately noticeable by their local community. 
The social studies on working-class families conducted by the sociologist G. 
Jacquemyns during the war reveal a great dislike among the working population of 
retailers: «They are all vagrants, hooligans who think they won't have to reckon 
with their customers after the war. They are dishonest and crude.»30 They were 
accused of not selling enough foodstuffs to customers from lower social classes, 
preferring instead to sell on the black market to the rich31. The same explanation 
holds true for the high number of attacks against tradesmen. In those cases where 
more details were given, it appears that grain and potato traders were often involved, 
activities connected with the provisioning of the population. Collaboration by these 
groups was particularly targeted by the population. In Limburg, a province with 
extensive mining activity, it was not the mine employers who were put up as the pro-
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totype of industrial collaboration by the communists, but the shopkeepers and tra-
desmen who were the butt of the people's wrath. 
III. INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 
Economic collaborators in the strictest sense of the word, such as industrialists 
and contractors, were not specifically targeted by the population. In West-Vlaande-
ren, where numerous contractors were used for the construction of German defence 
projects, very few attacks occurred against this group of economic collaborators. 
For Oost-Vlaanderen and Hainaut, the figures are less clear. Although industrialists 
increasingly suffered the animosity of the population, their share remained smaller 
than that for shopkeepers and tradesmen. As far as Hainaut is concerned, the higher 
proportion of industrial collaboration may be explained by the industrial character 
of the area, a factor which may have had the same effect in Oost-Vlaanderen. In 
some areas of the latter province, for instance in the town of Ronse where numerous 
attacks were committed against collaborators, the textile industry was a major force. 
More precise details on the cases of industrial collaboration show that sometimes 
quite specific factors triggered the anger of the population. A press campaign, the 
fact that a company had worked solely for the German army, or that its manager had 
had close ties with those responsible for the provisioning, might all be motives for 
an attack on an industrialist32. 
In Morlanwelz (Hainaut), fifty demonstrators broke into the house of the mana-
ger of the Usines de Baume et Marpent (metal works). Although this seems at first 
to be a textbook example of industrial collaboration, additional information revea-
led that this man was targeted not because of his economic activities, but because he 
had informed on a few of his workers33. Consequently, there was no general pattern 
of protest against manufacturers who had worked for the enemy during the occupa-
tion. 
Something which may appear paradoxical at first sight is the relatively high 
number of attacks on voluntary workers in Hainaut. This group was much hated by 
the population, and the confrontations were particularly violent. Their personal inte-
grity came under threat more than that of other collaborators, and the people vented 
its anger on their houses and possessions. Upon their return from Germany, the 
voluntary workers were beaten by a mob that had gathered at the station34. The gra-
vity with which this form of collaboration was regarded by the population becomes 
clear from an incident in Strepy-Bracquegnies, where voluntary workers were tarred 
with the same brush as the so-called «inciviques notoires» (leading political and 
administrative collaborators). On May 9th and 10th, a number of known collabora-
tors were arrested by the police by order of the military prosecutor. Immediately 
after, a 700-strong mob brought two voluntary workers to the police station, as if 
they had been overlooked by the police who had earlier arrested the 'prominent col-
laborators'35. 
Reports in SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1313. 
Report state security police La Louvière, 11.V. 1945, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1312. 
Report state security police Zinnik/Soignies, 5-11.V.1945, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1312. 
Report gendarmerie Houdeng- Goegnies, 11.V.1945, SOMA, Hoog Commissariaat, 1313. 
PROSECUTION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS 123 
Voluntary workers were also heavily stigmatized in their work surroundings. At 
a trade-union meeting of the left-wing Mouvement Syndical Unifié in the Liege-
based steelworks Cockerill, one of the speakers demanded the incarceration of the 
voluntary workers in a concentration camp and forced labour in a coal mine36. In 
some collieries, miners refused to work alongside returning voluntary workers37. 
The question remains as to why workers reacted so vehemently against volun-
tary work. During the occupation, working conditions in the mine were relatively 
good. Consequently, it was said that those who went to Germany to work did not do 
so out of necessity or misery, but out of conviction and without any moral duress. 
Because of this, their actions were not forgiven38. Those who had left because 
of material reasons could count on their fellow workers' sympathy, whereas the 
others could not39. Voluntary workers who had gone to Germany because they 
had been attracted by better wages and working conditions went against the group 
norm. 
Another motive which contributed to the strong sense of rejection towards 
voluntary labour, was what may be called a 'compensation effect'. Remaining in 
work during the war implied a certain degree of collusion with economic collabora-
tion as it contributed to an activity from which the Germans derived an advantage40. 
And a strong reaction against the voluntary workers, which, had it been taken one 
step further, could, like sabotaging or slowing down production, be a way of ratio-
nalizing one's own behaviour, or of minimizing its importance. 
The other side to the vehement reaction against the voluntary workers might be 
the fact the workers agreed with the industrialists' policy of maintaining production 
during the occupation, even though it benefited the enemy. This would explain the 
relatively low number of attacks on industrial collaborators. It is possible to support 
this logical conclusion with empirical evidence. During the occupation, G. Jacque-
myns observed that the behaviour of employers was rarely criticized by workers and 
that the latter agreed to the resumption of work after the capitulation and were stron-
gly attached to the preservation of their jobs: «The majority of workers are worried 
about losing their livelihood. Because 'one has to live', they want the machines to 
keep running; they hope they will not have to lay down their tools»41. This attitude 
remained fundamentally the same over the next years. The only reaction consisted 
of slowing down the working rhythm or of sabotage, a form of passive resistance 
which was also widespread among French workers42. Very few workers thought it 
politic to shut down production entirely. Job attachment increased after the intro-
duction of forced labour in Germany in 1942: «nearly everyone wants to be 'busy', 
because the risks are slightly less for those in work than for the others. The shop, the 
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mine, the office provide shelter. If need be, one wanted to be able to show the Werbe-
stelle a good recommendation from their employer.»43 
Postwar police reports reveal that attacks on industrialists were not aimed 
against those who had merely maintained production in their factories, but against 
those who had increased it. This type of protest was probably caused by indignation 
over the fact that the enemy was benefiting from this situation. Often, increased pro-
duction also implied that workers had to work harder. The resistance against increa-
sing production and not against the principle of maintaining economic activity also 
explains that it was not on the whole at the owners or managers of companies, but at 
the executives that popular discontent was directed. Here are some examples to cla-
rify the above. In September 1944, the military prosecutor of Charleroi (Hainaut) 
reported on a social conflict in the Monceau Fontaine colliery, where the miners 
refused to resume work until the production manager quit. He had attempted to 
increase production, while the workers had slowed down and committed acts of 
sabotage44. Two months later, the governor of the province of Hainaut mentioned 
that, following a strike against a foreman who had collaborated, workers were dis-
satisfied with the delay in convictions of industrialists. This was not aimed at all 
industrialists who had kept their companies running, but only at those who had 
boosted their production45. 
The same emphasis was voiced at rallies and demonstrations by trade unions and 
resistance organizations. On 14 May 1945, the Jeune Garde Socialiste (the socialist 
youth organization) organized a rally at which the communist, and leader of the left-
wing resistance organization Independence Front (Onafhankelijkheidsfront), F. 
Demany and the socialist MP G. Hoyaux were the speakers. The latter, who had just 
returned from a German camp, demanded that measures be taken against economic 
collaborators, but not against all industrialists who had worked for the enemy. The 
industrialists: «who crawled before the 'boches' and harrassed their personnel to 
drive them to maximum production» had to be punished»46. On 30 May 1945 at a 
rally of the socialist trade union FGTB (Federation Générale du Travail de Bel-
gique) in Huy, which was organized against civilian mobilization and in favour of a 
rise in purchasing power, attention was also paid to the repression. Again, no gene-
ral measures were demanded against the industrialists who had maintained their pro-
duction. Calls were made for a 'cleansing' among engineers in the metal industry47. 
It was not management, which drew up the general policy, but the executives, with 
whom the workers were in daily contact and who were charged with the implemen-
tation of the general policy, who formed the object of criticism. 
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Hence, there was no general protest among the population and workers against 
industrialists who had continued to produce, only against those who had exaggera-
ted or had treated their workforce badly. The same picture emerges from the social 
conflicts at the company level. With one exception, none of the strikes revolved 
around the policy of the repression. The exception was a metal-construction com-
pany whose managing director had a «record of being a collaborator». Cleansing 
was used only to buttress social demands, such as wage increases. 
In these cases, too, the social rather than the patriotic argument was used to stig-
matize the employer. A case in point in this respect is a conflict led by the commu-
nist union, at the Bois-du-Luc48 colliery (Hainaut). It was aimed at a system of work 
measurement which would disadvantage workers, and at the repressive action taken 
against workers who had objected to it. The collaboration issue was linked to it, but 
only in its social dimension. Workers no longer wanted to be ordered around by 
bosses who had been 'Hitler's stooges' during the war and who threatened workers 
who were sabotaging or striking with being sent to Germany on work detail49. 
Immediately after the liberation, the communist trade unions attempted to bring 
the issue of the prosecution of economic collaboration to the fore. There were calls 
for severe punishment by the courts and for the setting up of cleansing committees 
with workers as their members. Companies belonging to collaborators were suppo-
sed to be confiscated and governed by the workmen50. The Ardennes offensive was 
used to lend force to this demand, which, initially, did not meet with much approval. 
At that time, employers suspected of collaboration were also accused of having 
sabotaged production, as they were supposed to be hoping for a German victory51. 
However, despite its initial impetus, the movement quickly died out, and, during 
strikes in the spring of 1945, the collaboration issue no longer played a noticeable 
role. 
Things were hardly different in the Limburg mining areas. The communist trade 
union attempted to gain a foothold by, among other things, playing the repression 
card. However, in the organization's magazine, it was not industrial collaboration as 
a whole which came under attack. There were calls against only one managing 
director of one specific mine52. And at a rally a few days later, the repression issue 
was completely ignored53. 
The sources at the various levels show that the punishment of industrial collabo-
ration was not a matter of principle as far as the population and the working classes 
were concerned. Economic activities benefiting the enemy were perceived to be a 
problem only if they had had a direct negative effect on the living conditions of the 
population and of the workers. Industrial collaborators were taken to task only if 
they had worked excessively for the Germans, supplied solely to the German army, 
or denied workers their rights. Within the category of economic collaboration as a 
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whole, industrialists remained a minority. Those who were closer to the population, 
or the result of whose activities were directly visible were far more often targeted. 
The public made a clear distinction between industrial collaborators, on the one 
hand, and war usurers (especially black marketeers), on the other. In the district of 
the Tongeren war tribunal, the views on the way industrial collaboration was dealt 
with were mostly positive. The population wondered however when the courts were 
going to act against the war usurers54. The animosity towards these « war usurers » 
lay deeper than that towards the industrial collaborators. In a pamphlet addressed to 
the population in November 1944, the communist union attacked the « capitalists ». 
The pamphlet contained a number of general accusations concerning economic col-
laboration and support by industrials for collaboration movements. The only tan-
gible demand was the immediate arrest of : «All those who, by trading in the black 
market, ruined the health of the laboring classes.»55 It thus seems that even militant 
organizations which wanted to politicize the repression issue had to adapt them-
selves to the specific way in which the economic collaboration was perceived by the 
population. 
However, to say that the public opinion remained indifferent to the way the 
courts dealt with industrial collaboration would be too narrow a view. The reports by 
the national security service on the public opinion show that the population did 
demand measures against economic collaboration. 
An accurate assessment of the extent of these demands requires detailed analy-
sis. As in the case of the attacks against collaborators and of the social demands, 
stress was put on particular points. The first point, or criticism, concerned the equal 
treatment of economic collaborators and other types of collaborators. When talking 
about economic collaborators, the discussion did not centre on industrialists, but 
rather on the opposition between those who had enriched themselves and those who 
had not. Examples which are far too often quoted were black marketeers and traf-
fickers (Limburg, Namur, West-Vlaanderen). As for the industrial collaboration, it 
was only the slow pace of justice which was criticized and the fact that some sus-
pects were allowed to continue their activities (Liège, West-Vlaanderen). In some 
areas, it was the industrial collaboration which caused the most concern to people. 
This was the case in Liège, Mechelen (province of Antwerp) and Hainaut, where 
calls were made for stiffer sentences for the industrial collaborators and where the 
conviction of the carpentry firm De Coene of Kortrijk (West-Vlaanderen) which had 
supplied the German army with various goods, met with great approval. It was also 
in Hainaut that attempts were made to politicize industrial collaboration. At the 
beginning of June of 1945, a protest rally was organized against the amendment and 
weakening of article 115 of the Penal Code, which provided for the punishment of 
economic collaboration. This amendment also encountered resistance from the 
population in the Liège area, where people demanded the punishment of one of the 
large industrial collaborators. Here too, resistance organizations, first among which 
the Independence Front, attempted to politicize the issue. On 30 May 1945, the 
Independence Front organized a rally in Visé for which 400 people gathered. The 
central theme was the more stringent line on industrial collaboration. Interestingly 
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enough, the colliery employers were not their main targets, which again indicates 
that the population did not generally reject the policies of the business community56. 
A similar picture emerges from the reports about the public opinion in Mechelen, 
the centre of the furniture industry. The population considered that the furniture 
manufacturers were not being dealt with harshly enough. Reports on rallies organi-
zed by resistance movements prove, however, that the protest was not predicated on 
patriotic motives in the main. The furniture manufacturers were attacked not so 
much for having worked for the Germans, but rather for paying low wages. It was 
this aspect in particular which was stressed by the speakers at the rally. The second 
bone of contention involved the president of the fish corporation, who was accused 
of having sold rotten fish to the population while providing the good products to the 
enemy57. 
The sources for the reactions and views of the population regarding the econo-
mic collaboration issue reveal a shaded picture. The question remains as to the 
extent to which the policy of the Chief Military Prosecutor was influenced by the 
population's views and perceptions. 
IV. THE CHIEF MILITARY PROSECUTOR AND PUBLIC OPINION 
There are various aspects involved in determining the influence of public opi-
nion on the prosecution policy, but this should not be seen as a clear and mechanis-
tic process with only two variables. The relationship is to be considered in the 
context of the process of restoration of the legitimacy of the state after the war. Seen 
from this angle the interaction between the prosecution policy and the societal envi-
ronment had three aspects. The prosecution service tried to assess the reactions and 
sensibilities of the population and this was an element in the orientation of the policy 
of prosecution. This was considered to be a necessity in order to secure the legiti-
macy of the judiciary as part of the state. But Ganshof's strategy did not always or 
completely correspond to the government's policy. He used the reactions of the 
population against these political groups which advocated a very limited prosecu-
tion of economic collaboration. 
The combining of the two positions of Chief Military Prosecutor and High Com-
missioner for the Security of the Territory was already a first indication that the reac-
tion and sensitivities of public opinion were going to influence prosecution policy. 
It appears from the activities of the High Commissioner's Office that there was an 
intensive cooperation with the judicial departments. Reports from various police 
departments were communicated to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, which 
kept the military prosecutors informed of criticism of their actions58. Reports by the 
national security service on the popular response to certain decisions were submit-
ted to the president of the military court of appeal59. 
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Ganshof believed that as Chief Military Prosecutor it was his task to make sure 
that the prosecution policy was legitimate in the eyes of the population. This 
becomes clear from a dispute he had with the Minister of the Interior in May 1945. 
In a circular, the latter had insisted that the prosecutors should lock up individuals 
who were known to be collaborators in order to forestall any hostile actions by the 
population against these people. Ganshof considered this circular a criticism of the 
work of the military prosecution departments and argued that the anger of the people 
was directed mainly at the released internees, for which responsibility lay with the 
consultative commissions, and not with the military prosecutors60. Thus, in Gan-
shof's mind, the success of the judiciary was to some extent tantamount to its accep-
tance by the population. This was stated unambiguously by the Chief Military Pro-
secutor in his address in 1946, in which he defended his prosecution policy. Ganshof 
remarked that the way collaboration was dealt with was a matter of great interest to 
the population, who expected severe punishment. The repression had to be finished 
quickly and should not be fundamentally different from that which public opinion 
deemed just. If not, there would have been a real risk of people taking matters into 
their own hands: «They [the prosecution departments] knew that unrest, violence, 
summary executions, popular retribution could be avoided only insofar as the jus-
tice system inspired peoples' confidence and was capable of carrying out its assi-
gned task.»61 The concern to avoid 'mob justice' also formed the background to the 
amendment of the procedure in which Ganshof, in his capacity as Chief Military 
Prosecutor and High Commissioner, had participated: «We would have had to fear 
procedural complications and the repression of those violations which most deeply 
offend the national conscience would have been impaired or even thwarted.»62 The 
actions by the judiciary had to be directed: «at punishing without hesitation those 
actions which were the most offensive to consciences.»63 This also explains why cri-
ticism was levelled at the prosecution of petty collaborators: «The apparently petty 
offender is, in his own setting, in his own locality or region, an important source of 
reaction and permanent ill feeling which only the courts can appease.»64 
However, this does not imply that the Chief Military Prosecutor's policy was 
entirely determined by public opinion. On a number of points, it went against the 
views that were prevalent among the population. May it suffice to mention that, 
from the start, he gave instructions not to prosecute small economic collaborators 
and voluntary workers65. When assessing the influence of public opinion, a distinc-
tion has to be made between the direct and indirect impact. 
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There was a direct impact on two specific points of the prosecution policy: the 
speed and the emphasis on results, on the one hand, and the great attention paid to 
all aspects of economic collaboration, on the other. Soon after the liberation, Gans-
hof wanted to bring a number of important economic collaborators before the courts 
and to punish them severely, which is why priority was given to four cases, in which 
there could be little discussion as to whether the supplies to the enemy were puni-
shable at law since they were of a military nature66. In so doing, the Chief Military 
Prosecutor wanted to send a signal to the population that they should not get the 
impression that the courts acted leniently towards economic collaboration. For the 
same reason, it was to be avoided that higher appeal systematically resulted in a sub-
stantial reduction of sentences. In March 1946, the Chief Military Prosecutor recei-
ved a message from the national security service to the effect that the population 
took exception to sentence reduction on appeal for an economic collaborator. This 
was considered a symptom of the unequal treatment of petty and major collabora-
tors. Ganshof requested measures to speed up appeals, thus limiting the chance of a 
reduction of sentence67. 
The second direct influence bears on the Chief Military Prosecutor's concern to 
make sure that economic collaboration would in fact be prosecuted instead of being 
allowed to go unpunished, a wish expressed by the business community and in some 
political quarters. Ganshof believed that the entire repression would be discredited 
if economic collaboration was ignored68. On several occasions, Ganshof's view led 
to conflicts with the government, which revolved around the amendment of article 
115 of the Penal Code (April-May 1945), which was favoured by the government in 
order to temper a prosecution policy deemed too severe69. 
This last point brings us to the indirect influence of public opinion on the prose-
cution policy. The indirect impact was more important than the direct one. Despite 
his efforts, the Chief Military Prosecutor did not succeed in implementing his origi-
nal plan of prosecuting the major economic collaborators. Ganshof's policy was cri-
ticized not only by the business community, but also by politicians. This political 
opposition grew as time went on. Until the Spring of 1945, there was a «patriotic 
front», which stretched from the Communist to part of the Socialist to part of the 
Liberal parties. The communists in particular made the prosecution of major econo-
mic collaboration a priority. In late 1945, it was only the Communist Party and part 
of the Socialist Party which still adhered to this view. The development of the socia-
lists in particular is of importance here. The weakening of the tough stance was the 
result of pressure exerted by two factions. The first, which was that of Prime Minis-
ter Achille Van Acker, believed that it was not advisable to seek confrontation with 
the industrialists in the field of the repression at a time when a new social system 
was being set up 7 0. The second faction, which favoured a moderate line against the 
industrial collaborators, consisted of union representatives in the Socialist Party. 
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They argued that industrialists should not be dealt with too harshly as there had been 
a consensus during the war between the employers and the workers to maintain pro-
duction, even if this benefited the Germans, without however excessive profit 
making. This consensus may explain why none of the postwar reports of union 
managerial bodies makes any mention of the industrial collaboration issue. This tal-
lies with the above-mentioned observations about the perception of industrial colla-
boration by the workers and public opinion. However, was not this 'consensus' an 
ideological construction used to serve the interests of the industrialists? Partly it 
was, but it did have some ties with reality. The sectors controlled by holdings, such 
as the mines, metallurgical and metal construction industries attempted to comply 
with the Galopin doctrine, named after Alexandre Galopin, governor of the Société 
Générale, the main holding company. The doctrine was established by the leader-
ship of the holdings and prescribed a code of conduct for industry in times of occu-
pation. Although it implied that factories were allowed to work for the Germans, 
there were limits to the extent to which this could be done, and always with certain 
restrictions. Profit-making was never supposed to be a motive. This production 
policy was considered essential in order to ensure the provisioning of the country 
and to safeguard the workers against deportation to Germany. The policy of the 
Galopin committee had to be coupled with a social policy towards the workers71. 
This was not a policy of unbridled politically inspired collaboration ; rather it was 
intended to enable the company to survive the war72. As for companies, like the 
steelworks Ougrée-Marihaye, which followed this policy, the courts did not find 
many incriminating facts to warrant instituting charges73. The second element which 
places the ideological character of the consensus argument into perspective is the 
fact that the working classes depended on companies for their survival74. To this end, 
companies had to have a minimum of economic activities, which would always to 
some extent benefit the enemy. It was precisely this which the Galopin doctrine 
allegedly had in mind. In light of these observations, it is hardly surprising that 
workers and the public opinion took a relatively mild view of industrial collabora-
tion. 
An argument a contrario for the consensus thesis is found among the industria-
lists who were prosecuted after the war. This often involved companies which had 
treated their workers badly. The following two examples illustrate this. The first 
case is that of a Limburg metal-construction company which had supplied the Ger-
mans with shaking conveyors. The manager was particularly hated because of his 
'difficult personality' and the low wages he paid his workforce. Moreover, he was 
accused of having incited several workers to go and work in Germany75. 
The East Flemish shipbuilder B., who was sentenced to eight years imprison-
ment, could not exactly be accused of having followed a progressive social policy 
either. He extended the working hours, introduced Sunday work, and restricted 
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sabotage, while there was a strict disciplinary regime in the yard with a great deal of 
supervision. However, the major bone of contention was the introduction of the 
Bedaux-system, which was particularly hated by the workers76. 
After the war, these entrepreneurs could not count on any «solidarity» on the 
part of their workers, which made prosecution easier. Those industrialists who fol-
lowed the recommendations of the Galopin committee had succeeded in creating a 
kind of goodwill among their workforce. This resulted in the population at large not 
judging their behaviour too harshly. It raised the threshold for legal action, espe-
cially when it was faced with a growing political opposition which looked askance 
at the actions of the Chief Military Prosecutor against large-scale industrial collabo-
ration and which made the consensus argument a core issue in its defence of econo-
mic collaborators. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we have examined the relationship between the policy of the Chief 
Military Prosecutor and the population's reactions to the repression of economic 
collaboration. This form of crime affected various aspects of society. The central 
question was whether actions by the judiciary were influenced by the social sur-
roundings, and if so, in what way. 
The Chief Military Prosecutor, who was also the High Commissioner for the 
Security of the Territory, believed that the punishment of economic collaboration 
had to correspond to some extent with the views of the population. This is why he 
made a priority of quickly and severely punishing this type of collaboration. This 
was considered to be crucial for the restoration of the authority and the legitimacy of 
the state after the liberation. 
Public opinion and the workers demanded a severe punishment of economic col-
laboration but gave a specific definition to this concept. The population's resentment 
was directed mainly at those economic collaborators who were closest to their day-
to-day lives and/or played a direct role in their survival strategies. Shopkeepers, tra-
desman, traffickers and black marketeers were targeted more than industrial colla-
borators, who were criticized only if they had had too many business dealings with 
the enemy or had treated their workers badly. 
On the whole, industrialists who had subscribed to the Galopin doctrine were not 
targeted. This may be explained by the restrictive nature of their economic activity, 
which was necessary to keep the workers in the country and to ensure their survival. 
This specific perception by public opinion of economic collaboration had direct 
and indirect effects on the judiciary. Economic collaboration could not be excluded 
from prosecution as a matter of course. The indirect consequence was that the Chief 
Military Prosecutor's Office could not carry the prosecution policy to the extreme as 
the societal base was not large enough to counter growing political opposition. 
More detailed investigation is required in order to place the judicial action in as 
wide a context as possible and to view it as a social phenomenon. It is the entire legal 
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proceedings, rather than just the prosecution, which need to be examined. The few 
international efforts in this field have proven the usefulness of this approach77. 
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